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REFLECTIONS IN A DISTANT MIRROR:
JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
THROUGH AMERICAN EYES
Ronald J. Gilson"
For the last ten years, Japanese corporate governance
has served as a distant mirror in whose reflection American
academics could better see the attributes of their own
system. As scholars came to recognize that the institutional
characteristics of the American and Japanese systems were
politically and historically contingent,' other countries'
approaches became serious objects of study, rather than
just way stations on the road to convergence. One learned
about one's own system from the choices made by others.
As it came to be conceived, the Japanese corporation of
the 1980s represented quite a different method of
organizing production. Styled the "J-form" by Masahiko
Aoki, the Japanese corporation combined an interlocking
set of governance arrangements that supported a different
kind of industrial organization.2 The main bank
relationship, coupled with cross shareholdings, supported a
management commitment to lifetime employment for an
. Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business,
Stanford Law
School, and Mark and Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business,
Columbia Law School. The author is grateful to the Sloan Foundation for
financial support, and to Laura Menninger for research assistance.
1 For the United States, see MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).

For Japan, see, for example, Tetsuji Okazaki, The Japanese Firm under
the Wartime Planned Economy, in THE JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF
COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 350 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore eds., 1994);
TAKEO HOSHI, EVOLUTION OF THE MAIN BANK SYSTEM IN JAPAN, (Graduate

School of Int'l Relations and Pacific Studies, Univ. of California, San
Diego Working Paper, Mar. 1993); RONALD J. GILSON & MARK J. ROE,
LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT: LABOR PEACE AND THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Columbia Law School Working Paper, Sept.

1997).
'Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm,
28 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 8 (1990).
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important subset of employees who, in turn, had the proper
incentives to invest in the firm specific human capital
necessary for a production system geared to horizontal
coordination and information sharing.3 Central to the Jform was a commitment to organizational stability,
consistent with what was said to be a Japanese focus on
process technologies
Corporate governance in the United States during this
period stood in sharp contrast to the Japanese emphasis on
commitment and stability. The American system, open to
external influence through the capital market, excelled in
fast response to changes in the economic environment,'
what Douglass North refers to as adaptive efficiency.'
During the 1980s, conglomerates were broken up either by
successful raiders or anticipatory management sponsored
spinoffs and asset sales; American corporations thereby
refocused their attention on their core businesses. As part
of the process, work force levels were reduced quickly to
reflect the demands of heightened global competition.
Comparative scholarship highlighted the contrasting
characteristics of the two corporate governance systems.
The image of the American system in the Japanese mirror
appeared to reveal fundamental weaknesses. The
permanence of main bank relationships gave rise, American
'While this description captures the system as it is said to appear in
equilibrium, lifetime employment appears to have had its origins in
politics, not economics, arising out of the immediate post-World War II
environment and then adding complimentary characteristics through
economic
selection. GILSON & ROE, supra note 1, at 15-25.
4
Id. at 6-9.
5 See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The PoliticalEcology of Takeovers:
Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate Governance
Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 161 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson,
Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When do Institutions
Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327 (1996).
6 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 80 (1990).

Empirical evidence on the return to focus in U.S. industry and the
impact on workers is summarized in RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S.
BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS chs. 9 & 15
(2d ed. 1995).
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critics claimed, to patient capital that encouraged managers
to adopt a long-term investment horizon. This compared
favorably to the short-term outlook said to be associated
with U.S. managers who confronting a stock marketcentered capital market, feared that the stock market's
fickleness would be enforced by the market for corporate
control if not catered to by a focus on quarter-to-quarter
earnings growth.8 The contrast seemed most sharp in the
automobile industry. It was thought that Japanese lean
production supported both by employees rendered
cooperative and inventive by lifetime employment, and
close, long-term ties to suppliers - could not be matched
without
dramatic
changes
in
U.S.
governance
arrangements.9
In fact, the United States learned from examining its
image in the Japanese mirror, but the lesson increasingly
appears to be different than what critics expected.
American manufacturers adopted lean production, but
adapted it to fit their governance system, rather than
adapting their governance structure to fit the production
method. As has been stressed by Charles Sabel, the link
between governance structure and production technology
was less tight than had been imagined. ° The American
system's adaptive efficiency turned out to be more powerful
than expected."
" See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's
FailingCapitalInvestment System, HARV. Bus. REV. Sept.-Oct. 1992, 65.
9 CHARLES F. SABEL, UNGOVERNED PRODUCTION: AN AMERICAN VIEW
OF THE NOVEL UNIVERSALISM OF JAPANESE PRODUCTION METHODS 1-2

(Columbia Law School Working Paper, Feb. 1996).
10Id.; SUSAN HELPER ET AL., THE BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRM AS A DESIGN

PROBLEM (Columbia Law School Working Paper, Feb. 1997).
" The irony is intriguing. Steven Kaplan has shown that despite
significant institutional differences and the reputed Japanese
commitment to long-term investment horizons, Japanese corporations
replace senior managers with roughly the same sensitivity to stock price
and accounting earnings performance as American companies. Steven N.
Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance:A Comparison of
Japanand the United States, 102 J. POL. ECON. 510 (1994). See Jun-Koo
Kang & Anil Shivdasani, Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and
Top Executive Turnoverin Japan, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 55-56 (1995). Each
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My goal in this paper is to return the favor done for the
United States by the Japanese governance system, by
holding up an American mirror in whose reflection
Japanese scholars may find insights into their own system.
In recent years, exogenous changes have shocked each
component of Aoki's J-form of organization. Increased
international capital requirements and the drop in asset
values with the passing of the bubble economy have
weakened Japanese banks and threatened the continued
maintenance of cross-holdings. In turn, the success of many
Japanese companies and their increased access to
international capital markets have reduced reliance on
their main banks for capital and decreased the ability of the
main bank to effectively monitor management performance.
The movement of Japanese production offshore, the need to
shrink the size of the work force in response to increased
competition, and the resulting decrease in the number of
positions to which lifetime employment is attached,
threatens to change the incentives of the next generation of
employees. When reflected in an American mirror, this
wave of economic change highlights a critical uncertainty
concerning the Japanese corporate governance system:
What are the instruments of adaptive efficiency in a system
structured to support commitment and stability?
Part I provides a brief description of Japanese corporate
governance as presented in the academic literature,
highlighting how each attribute of its structure is said to
interact in support of commitment and stability. Part II
then depicts the American system, highlighting, in contrast,
its distinctive elements of adaptive efficiency. Part III
catalogues the challenges changing economic conditions
pose for the Japanese system, and frames the questions an
American mirror reveals about the Japanese system's
adaptive mechanisms. Part IV concludes with brief
system solved the problem of replacing poorly performing managers
within their own institutional arrangements. So too, American
companies solved the problem of lean production not by imitating
Japanese governance institutions, but by making changes within their
own institutional arrangements.

No. 1:203]

JAPAINESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

comments on the role of external monitoring as a
mechanism of adaptive efficiency in a system of
complementary attributes.
I. JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
COMMITMENT AND STABILITY
The standard account of the J-form of corporate
governance builds from the nature of the production
process. As told by Aoki and others, Japanese production is
characterized by horizontal coordination in which operating
units are defined by the need for shared knowledge, rather
than skill specialization. 2 When external environments are
continually evolving at a moderate pace, the flexibility and
ease of adaptation of the Japanese system and its resulting
strength in process innovation outperforms the hierarchical
specialization of U.S. style assembly production keyed to
exhausting economies of scale. In this horizontal rather
than hierarchical system of organizing production, labor
plays a central role. As Aoki stresses, "the J-mode of
horizontal coordination based on shared learning at the
factory site has emerged and developed in the last two
decades or so by relying on highly qualified and diligent
blue-collar
workers who have formed the core of the work
3
team."
The high quality and loyalty of blue-collar workers
necessary to Japanese organization of production is said to
require large investments of both firm specific 4 and general
human capital. 5 But investment in firm specific human
,2Aold,supra note 2, at 3-10.
'3Id. at9.
" See, e.g., Gerald T. Garvey & Peter L. Swan, The Interaction
Between Financial and Employment Contracts: A Formal Model of
Japanese Governance, 6 J. JAP. & INT'L ECON. 247, 249 (1992). See
Yoshitsugu Kanemoto & Bentley MacLeod, Optimal Labor Contracts
with NoncontractibleHuman Capital,4 J. JAP. & INT'L ECON. 385 (1989);
Allan S. Blinder, More Like Them?, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Winter 1992, at
57-60.
"5Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Complimentarities and Systems:
Understanding Japanese Economic Organization, 1 ESTUDIOS
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capital creates employee job-related rents subject to
opportunistic behavior by the employer, and investment in
general human capital by firms creates the risk that
employees will take their skills elsewhere. Thus, Japanese
organization of production requires structures which
protect employees' and employers' expected returns on firm
specific and general human capital. Lifetime employment
protects employees, and the concomitant destruction of the
external labor market protects employers.16
However, an additional level of protection is necessary to
make credible the commitment to employment stability said
to be pivotal to Japanese industrial organization. What
protects employees against the risk that employers,
encouraged by shareholders, may renege on the implicit
promise of lifetime employment, thereby effecting a wealth
transfer from labor to capital of the quasi-rents associated
with firm specific investment? The threat of that
expropriation is a barrier to efficient levels of investment.
A different attribute of Japanese corporate governance is
said to respond to this threat. Interlocking shareholdings is
a striking feature of large Japanese corporations. Paul
Sheard reports that, on average, less than a quarter of a
Japanese corporation's outstanding shares are held by
individual investors; more than two-thirds are held by other
Japanese
corporations.18 These stable interlocking
shareholdings protect management from capital market
pressure to renege on the corporation's implicit contract

EcoNoMIcos 3 (1994); Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 6-10; Sabel, supra

note 9, at 12-13.
Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 39.
1
7 See, e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 15; Garvey & Swan,
supra
note 14. For an analysis in the context of the U.S. takeover market, see
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOvERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 4142 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). For a critical analysis and summary of
the empirical evidence, see Gilson & Black, supranote 7, ch. 15.
8 Paul
Sheard, Interlocking Shareholdings and Corporate
Governance, in THE JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE
STRENGTH at 310.
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with its permanent employees.19
If employees are protected from discharge by lifetime
employment and managers are protected from the scrutiny
of the capital market by cross-holdings, then what provides
the monitoring of both management and worker
performance necessary to efficient production? Without
more, management and workers may share a preference for
the quiet as opposed to the profitable life. It is at this point
that the main bank fits into the Japanese corporate
governance system.
Growing out of the allocation of defense industry
companies to supervising banks during World War HI,2" the
Japanese main bank system is said to provide "a unique
contingent corporate governance system in which
management control shifts between internal management
and the main bank, depending on the financial state of the
two
firm.121 Such a monitoring system requires
19

Sheard describes that a stable shareholder:
holds the shares as a 'friendly' insider sympathetic to
incumbent management: agrees not to sell the shares to
third parties unsympathetic to incumbent management,
particularly hostile take-over bidders or bidders trying
to accumulate strategic parcels of shares: agrees, in the
event that disposal of the shares is necessary, to consult
the firm or at least give notice of its intention to sell.

Id. at 314, 318. Garvey & Swan, supra note 14, develop a similar
model of the link between employment and governance structures.
Interlocking shareholdings also may serve to support product exchange
among shareholders. See also Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate
Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 900-01
(1993).
UNINTENDED FIT:
20 Hoshi, supra note 1; MASAHIKO AOKI,
ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION AND GOVERNMENT DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONS IN

JAPAN (Stanford Univ. Center for Econ. Policy Research Paper No. 434,
1995); Juro Teranishi, Loan Syndication in War-Time Japan and the
Origins of the Main Bank System, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM:
ITS RELEVANCE FOR DELEVOPING AND TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES 51, 65-75

(Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994).
21 Masahiko Aoki et al., The Japanese Main Bank System: An
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characteristics: a continuing source of information
concerning firm performance; and a mechanism for
influencing and, in the extreme, replacing management
when information discloses poor performance.2
The primacy of debt in the corporation's capital
structure prior to the liberalization of the Japanese capital
markets in the 1980s, 23 and the main bank's role as the
corporation's major lender and the informal leader of the
syndicate of banks providing the remainder of the
corporation's financing, combined to give the main bank the
power to review the corporation's capital budgeting process,
a form of ex ante monitoring." Thereafter, the main bank's
carrying of the corporation's major payment settlement
accounts, so that it is aware on a real time basis of the
corporation's cash flow condition, provides a form of interim
monitoring of ongoing performance.2 5 Finally, because the
main bank is typically the corporation's largest
shareholder, and because it controls the corporation's access
to the debt market through its informal role as syndicate
manager, it can ascertain the outcome of the corporation's
efforts and, if necessary, replace poorly performing
management. 6 If replacement is necessary, the main bank
is understood to have the informal obligation to finance any
Introductory Overview, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 3, 19.

See

Masahiko Aoki, Monitoring Characteristicsof the Main Bank System: An
Analytical and Developmental View, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM
109, 122-24. See generally Masahiko Aoki, The Japanese Firm as a
System of Attributes: A Survey and a Research Agenda, in THE JAPANESE
FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH.

Aoki et al., supranote 21, at 25-26.
In 1975, banks provided more than 90% of Japanese public
corporation debt; in 1992, the percentage had shrunk to less than 50%,
reflecting post-deregulation access to public debt markets. TAKEO HOsHI
ET AL., THE CHOICE BETWEEN PUBIC AND PRIVATE DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF
POST-DEREGULATION CORPORATE FINANCING IN JAPAN (National Bureau of

Econ. Research Working Paper No. 4421, Aug. 1993).
' See Aoki et al., supra note 21, at 41; Aold, Monitoring
Characteristicsof the Main Bank System, supra note 21, at 111-19.
Aoki et al., supranote 21, at 14-15.
26 Aoki, Monitoring Characteristicsof the Main
Bank System, supra
note 21, at 111-22. See generally Aoki et al., supra note 21.

No. 1:203]

JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

necessary restructuring on behalf of itself and the other
lenders to the corporation.
While the standard account of the main bank's role is
not without its critics,2 8 the crucial aspect of this contingent

monitoring system is that it is essentially internal; that is,
monitoring is assigned to an entity with a long-term,
intimate relation to the company. The benefit of internal,
bank-centered monitoring is said to be the quality of
information available to the bank,29 and the ease with
which rescue operations are raised in comparison to
' Paul Sheard, Reciprocal Delegated Monitoring, in THE JAPANESE
12-17 (1994). See generally

MAIN BANK SYSTEM, 8 J. JAP. & INT'L ECON. 1,

Paul Sheard, Main Banks and the Governance of FinancialDistress, in
THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 188. That obligation is said to be
enforced informally:
[Tihe crux of banking regulation by the Ministry of
Finance in the post-war period has been to regulate
severely the entries of commercial banks into the
exclusive club of city banks qualified as [main banks]
for major firms. It has also consistently punished
liquidating banks [banks that did not bail out borrowers
for whom they were the main bank] while rewarding
rescuing banks by fine adjustments of the number of
annual awards of branch licensing to city banks.
Aoki, The JapaneseFirm as a System ofAttributes, supra note 21, at
33. Main bank rescue also compliments the lifetime employment system
by helping to preserve the firm-specific human capital which lifetime
employment is said to encourage. Id. at 25. See also Aoki et al., supra
note 21, at 18-19.
See generally YOSHIRO MiWA, FIRMS AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

ch. 6 (1996); J. Mark Ramsayer, Explicit Reasons for Implicit
Contracts: The Legal Logic to the Japanese Main Bank System, in THE
JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM at 231; Hideki Kanda, Corporate
Governance in Japan (Conference on Comparative Corporate
Governance, Center for Law and Economics, Columbia Law School, May,
1997); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance
and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany,
Japanand the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1995).
29The argument in favor of the efficiency of bank-centered monitoring
is not limited to the Japanese system. A more general efficiency claim for
bank-centered systems is developed in JEREMY EDWARDS & KLAUS
FISCHER, BANKS, FINANCE AND INVESTMENT IN GERMANY ch. 2 (1994).
IN JAPAN
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expensive U.S. style formal bankruptcy. This contrasts to
the external monitoring associated with a stock marketcentered capital market, where information concerning a
corporation is produced by a variety of market institutions
ranging from investment banks and securities analysts to
stock prices which play both an ex ante and interim role,
and where ex post monitoring is provided internally through
an independent board of directors and externally through
the market for corporate control."
The now conventional depiction of Japanese corporate
governance thus describes a set of interlocking institutional
attributes that serve to support a particular mode of
organizing production and the commitment to stable
employment such a production mode requires. A system of
internal monitoring by the main bank provides the system's
discipline without upsetting its stability.
I. UNITED STATES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
MECHANISMS OF ADAPTIVE EFFICIENCY
The dominant characteristics of U.S. corporate
governance during the 1980s contrast sharply with those of
Japanese corporate governance.
The U.S. system
highlighted mechanisms of adaptive efficiency rather than
institutional attributes that support commitment and
stability.
Entering the 1980s, important segments of the U.S.
economy were characterized by diversified businesses left
over from conglomerate acquisitions of the 1960s and
1970s, and industries with free cash flow - cash flow in
excess of that necessary for working capital and positive net
present value investments. These companies were not
"unprofitable" measured in terms other than opportunity
cost, but their assets could be more efficiently utilized.
The development of junk bond financing provided a
means to restructure these industries. Originally created to
30

See, e.g., Aoki, Monitoring Characteristics of the Main Bank

System, supra note 21.
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provide access to the public debt market to companies
whose credit rating was below investment grade, the use of
junk bonds was extended in the 1980s to finance hostile
bust-up takeovers and leveraged buyouts that had the
function of reallocating assets to companies in more closely
related businesses. Looking at a sample of 62 hostile
takeovers between 1984 and 1986, Andrei Shleifer and
Robert Vishny report that 72 percent of all assets that
changed hands in hostile takeovers ended up with publicly
traded corporations in closely related businesses within
three years of the transaction.3' Ronald Perelman's bitterly
contested acquisition of Revlon provides an example. After
Revlon expanded into health care at the expense of support
for its cosmetic business, Perelman acquired Revlon for $2.3
billion in a junk bond financed transaction initiated when
the pre-transaction market value of Revlon's common stock
was approximately $1.2 billion. 2 Thereafter, Perelman sold
Revlon's health care and other noncosmetic businesses for
$2.06 billion, and refocused attention on its core cosmetic
business with a resulting increase in profits.3 3
Management buyouts and leveraged recapitalizations
often served the identical purpose, although typically they
were friendly transactions initiated in anticipation of a
hostile takeover bid. Existing management, with the help of
an outside investor like Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts as in a
management sponsored leveraged buyout, or independently
as in a recapitalization, paid out large amounts to
shareholders that had been raised by junk bond financing
and sales of unrelated assets to third parties.34
3' Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Takeover Wave of the
1980s, 249 SC. 745, 747 (1990). See Sanjai Bhagat et al., Hostile
Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 0(0), Special Issue, 1-72, 1 (1990).
For a survey of the empirical evidence on deconglomeration during the
1980s, see Gilson & Black, supra note 7, ch. 9.
32
Schleifer & Vishny, supra note 31, at 746-47.
Id. At the time of the sell-off, Perelman declined a $905 million
offer for the cosmetic business, which would have resulted in total posttransaction value of $3.26 billion for assets acquired for $2.3 billion.
' These forms of transactions are surveyed in Gilson & Black, supra
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For present purposes, the important characteristic of
these transactions is that they represented a form of
external monitoring by the capital market. The
transactions took place precisely because internal
monitoring systems, essentially the board of directors,
failed. This suggests an important complimentarity:
Different types of governance responses should be
associated with different kinds of mismanagement. In a
governance system that has both internal and external
governance institutions, the match between governance
technique and the particular form of mismanagement
should be endogenous.
There is some preliminary evidence of this kind of
governance complimentarity. Randall Morck, Andrei
Shleifer and Robert Vishny provide interesting empirical
evidence of when a corporation's poor performance leads to
an internal as opposed to an external governance response;
that is, where the incumbent board replaces operating
management as opposed to replacement occurring by means
of the external governance response of a hostile takeover."
Tracking a sample of 454 of the 1980 Fortune 500
companies over the period 1981 to 1985, the authors
conclude that an internal governance response is more
likely when a company performs poorly compared to
industry competitors." Hostile takeovers, in contrast, are
more likely when poor performance is industry wide.3 7 In
short, hostile acquisitions appear to be associated with
paradigmatic changes concerning the nature of a target
corporation's business and industry.
On reflection, this result seems to flow from the type of
information necessary to identify and evaluate the different
kinds of problems. Identifying poor performance compared
to competitors appears from readily available industry data
and industry adjusted stock performance typically provided
note 7, ch. 11.
35 Randall Morck et al., Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate
Control, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 842 (1989).
36 Id. at 842, 851-52.
37 Id.
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of directors.

Industry

insiders,

including

independent directors, are well positioned to evaluate and
act upon information concerning comparative performance.
In contrast, the information necessary to evaluate the
structure of an entire industry is more difficult to obtain
from within the industry, as is the experience necessary to
accomplish the task. Anecdotal support of the distinction
appears not only from the deconglomeration takeovers of
the 1980s, but also from the highly publicized internally
generated management changes in the 1990s. Board
initiated management changes at General Motors, IBM,
American Express, Westinghouse, and Kodak appear to
reflect not industry wide paradigm changes, but company
focused poor performance ultimately recognizable to those
inside the company.38
Thus, American corporate governance of the 1980s
presented a very different emphasis than did Japanese
governance. Japanese corporate governance consisted of an
interlocking set of attributes that supported a credible
commitment to employment stability said to be at the core
of Japanese production methods. American corporate
governance, in contrast, presented an array of mechanisms
of adaptive efficiency, responsive to different kinds of poor
performance. Essentially, one system emphasized internal
monitoring to support stability, the other external
monitoring to facilitate change.
III. CHALLENGES TO JAPANESE

GOVERNANCE IN THE 1990S
In Part I, I characterized Japanese corporate governance
as an interlocking set of attributes - assured employment,
Why internal monitoring took so long to respond, and what
changed the culture of the American board room, is a different story
which, at its center, features the rise of institutional investors as a force
in corporate governance. See, e.g., ROE, supra note 1; Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
InstitutionalInvestors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Bernard S. Black,
ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990).
38
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protected by cross-holdings from breach by takeover, and
monitored by the main bank to assure viability - that
facilitated the commitment and stability necessary to
Japanese production methods. We now reconsider these
attributes as reflected in the distant mirror of American
corporate governance. Just as comparison with the
Japanese system highlighted the American system's limited
capacity to credibly commit to stability, the image of the
Japanese system in the American mirror now highlights the
Japanese system's limited mechanisms of adaptive
efficiency. It also raises a set of questions, the answers to
which must be left to our Japanese colleagues, concerning
how the Japanese corporate governance system will
respond to economic changes in the 1990s that challenge
each of the attributes that comprise the J-form system.
.The American experience of the 1980s highlighted a
difference between the problems to which internal and
external monitoring mechanisms best responded. The
external monitoring mechanism of the U.S. takeover
market of the 1980s operated primarily to break up the
conglomerates of the 1960s and 1970s whose principal
problem was not financial peril, but excessive growth from
the misuse of free cash flow. In contrast, the internal
monitoring mechanism of the Japanese main bank system
had little experience in or, as it turned out, aptitude for
overseeing the effective utilization of free cash flow. Few
Japanese companies had free cash flow prior to the 1980s;
they were expanding their core businesses, reinvesting
profits, and seeking bank financing for further expansion.
For this purpose, the internal character of contingent
monitoring functioned well.
The 1980s, however, altered both the problems
confronting Japanese corporate governance and the
system's capacity for dealing with it. The success of
Japanese corporations allowed financing of expansion
through retained earnings and the liberalization of access
to the capital market allowed a shift from bank to public
debt, in both cases attenuating the ability of main banks to
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provide effective monitoring.39 Moreover, internal bank
monitoring was not itself well designed to cope with the
problems associated with free cash flow; the shift in
financing sources particularly attenuated ex ante
monitoring of project selection. The American experience
suggests that internal monitoring responds to problems
associated with management failure, but that external
monitoring is necessary to respond to problems of success.
In this regard, main bank contingent monitoring is
triggered by poorly performing management. Good
performance, on the other hand, frees management from
bank monitoring, creating "a sort of vacuum... regarding
the monitoring of management of these firms...."4 0 Indeed,
the very fact of the bubble economy and the underlying
reckless financial decision-making "painfully demonstrated
ex post the weakened monitoring capacity of banks in the
newly emergent market environment.""1
Viewing the Japanese corporate governance system in
the reflection of an American mirror thus reveals that the
internal monitoring associated with the main bank system
is unlikely to effectively monitor management problems
associated with success; the main bank system is not a
substitute for external monitoring by the market for
corporate control. 42 The question then posed for close

observers of the Japanese system is the identity of potential
sources of external monitoring: what are the mechanisms of
adaptive efficiency?
The mismatch between internal bank monitoring and
the problems associated with success rather than failure is
not the only economic change challenging the
complimentary attributes of the Japanese corporate
governance system. The collapse of the bubble economy and
the competitive environment of the 1990s resulted in two
additional challenges: the decreasing strength of the
39 See generally HOSHI ET AL., supra note 23; Kanda, supra note 28.
,0 Aoki et al., supra note 21, at 24.
41
Id. at 48.
2
Gilson & Roe, supra note 19, at 896-97.
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Japanese main bank, and the change in the character of
Japanese production that the main bank system served to
support.
Consider first the capacity of the Japanese main bank to
play the role assigned to it in the Japanese corporate
governance system. If the success leading up to the bubble
economy was beyond the ability of internal contingent
monitoring to restrain, the consequences of the collapse of
the bubble economy raises questions of the main bank's
ability to monitor internally in the future. In particular, the
dramatic fall in asset values left the main banks with
substantial amounts of bad debts,43 resulting in their being
forced to pay a premium for capital in the international
lending markets." The substantial drop in the Nikkei
average has exacerbated this capital problem. Main banks,
already short on capital, were relying upon the paper
profits of their cross-holdings to meet the Bank of
International Settlement's capital requirements of eight
percent of loans outstanding. For example, it was estimated
that Yasuda Trust & Banking Co. lost all of its stock
holdings based profits when the Nikkei dropped to 18200,
and that Fuji Bank would confront the same problem if the
Nikkei hit 16100. 45 The need to maintain capital levels and
the fear of further stock market decline puts substantial
pressure on bank cross-holdings, a central feature of the
Japanese corporate governance system.
At the same time that economic change has challenged
the main banks' ability to discharge its internal monitoring
role, a different set of economic changes have challenged

' Jathon Sapsford, Don't be Fooled: Japan's Banks are Still in
Trouble, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1996, at A8.
4Jathon
Sapsford, Dreaded Premium Resurfaces as Stock Declines
Shrink Banks'Assets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1997, at A12.
"' Jathon Sapsford & Robert Steiner, Loss Leaders: Japan's Banks
Struggle with Many Problems, Spur Slumps in Stocks, WALL ST. J., Jan.
22, 1997, at Al; Jathon Sapsford & Robert Steiner, Japanese Stock
Plunge Signals Painful Fallout of Deregulation Trend, WALL ST. J., Jan.
10, 1997, at Al; Jathon Sapsford, Nikkei's Drop Erodes Cushion of Japan
Banks, WALL ST. J., Jan 9, 1997, at A8.
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the system of permanent employment that the main bank
system is said to support. The demand for labor in Japan
has decreased in response to the shift of manufacturing
capacity abroad, spurred by a higher yen value and
increased global competition from manufacturing plants in
low wage countries as well as those in the United States
where restructurings in the 1980s significantly lowered
labor costs. The result has been pressure on the institution
of permanent employment, the linchpin of the Japanese
corporate governance system.46 For present purposes, we
need not enter into the debate over whether current
conditions will cause Japanese corporations to breach their
commitment to existing permanent employees through
layoffs or forced retirements.4 7 Instead, consider only the
potential impact of simply shrinking through attrition the
core of positions to which permanent employment
attaches.4 8
One such strategy is to replace attrition generated
permanent positions with a new category of employee in
whom employers invest more in training than with respect
to current temporary employees, but to whom no
commitment of job permanence is made. 49 The resulting
position more closely resembles U.S. employment patterns,
" Michael Williams, Japan's Labor System: A Two-Edged Sword,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1994, at A19.
41See, e.g., Seiritsu Ogura, 'Voluntay' Retirement Looms in Japan,
WALL ST. J., July 6, 1993, at A6; Robert Simison & Valerie Reitman,
Toyota Says it May Have to Shut Down Plants in Japan; Layoffs are
Possibility,WALL ST. J., May 12, 1995, at AS.
48Two leading Japanese labor law scholars predict that the Japanese
labor market will undergo the "dimunition and dilution of long-term
employment and an increase in labour mobility.... In the medium to
long term, workers at the core of enterprise management [permanent
employees] will relatively decrease, and the rate of labour turnover will
rise with growth in job changes and mid-career hirings." KAZUO SUGENO
& YASUO SUWA, LABOR LAW TOwARD THE 21ST CENTURY: SUPPORTING
INDMDUAL WORKERS IN THE LABOUR MARKET 5-6 (Japan Int'l Labour Law

Forum
Paper No. 7, Mar. 1996).
4
1 See KAZUO SUGENO & YASUO SUWA, THE INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET
AND ITS LEGAL ADJUSTMENTS 1-3 (Japan Int'l Labour Law Forum Paper

No. 4, Mar. 1995).
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but the crucial issue is whether the J-form system of
horizontal coordination through information sharing can
survive the reciprocal change in worker attitudes resulting
from the proliferation of non-lifetime employees. The
flexibility given employers to control the workplace, critical
to horizontal coordination, is said to be the balance to
permanent employment.0 Can flexibility survive the loss of
permanent employment? Here the need is to examine
Japanese production in the reflection of American
adaptation of Japanese production methods to a system
without a commitment to permanent employment.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE INSTITUTIONS OF

ADAPTIVE EFFICIENCY
In an important article, Paul Milgrom and John Roberts
stress the complementarity of different segments of the
Japanese corporate governance system."1 When a
complementarity component is added to a system, returns
increase to the enlarged system by more than the additional
input of the newly added component; output of pre-existing
components, to which the new component
is
2
complementarity, also increases. The resulting increasing
return characteristics shape the system's development by
favoring the addition of components that increase the
output of preexisting components.53 Overall, output
"0Id. at 16. See Takashi Araki, Flexibility in Japanese Employment
Relations and the Role of the Judiciary, in JAPANESE COMMERCIAL LAW IN
AN ERA OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 249 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1994).

" Milgrom & Roberts, supranote 15. This approach is also pursued in
Aoki, The JapaneseFirm as a System ofAttributes, supra note 21, at 2223.
52 Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 15. This increasing return
phenomenon
results
when
the
complimentarity
exhibits
"supermodularity." See also Paul Milgrom & John Roberts,
Complimentarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure, and Organizational
Change in Manufacturing, 19 J. ACCTN'G & EcON. 179 (1995); Paul
Milgrom & John Roberts, The Economics of Modern Manufacturing:
Technology, Strategy and Organization,80 AM. ECON. REv. 511 (1990).
GILSON & ROE, supra note 1, trace the development of the
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develops rapidly as the addition of each new component
leverages the contributions of the system's existing
components.
Like leverage, however, complementarity has a down
side. Changing a single component of a complementarity
system has the potential of reducing the output of the
system's remaining components. This characteristic places
enormous pressure on the mechanisms of adaptive
efficiency. If one component of the system is adversely
affected by exogenous economic change, a prompt
adjustment may be necessary across the remaining
components if significant performance degradation is to be
avoided. As Milgrom
and Roberts
note, in a
complementarity system "[elven if a coordinate adjustment
on all relevant dimensions might yield an improvement in
performance, it may be that until all the features of the new
pattern have been implemented, the performance of the
system may be much worse than in the original position."54
But adjustment of all relevant dimensions of a system is a
good description of the kind of paradigmatic change that
the American experience suggests must be accomplished
through external monitoring mechanisms. When viewed in
the reflection of the American mirror, the Japanese system
appears to require external mechanisms of adaptive
efficiency to respond to the set of pressures affecting all
components of the governance system. The question for
close students of Japanese governance is in a system whose
central logic is keyed to the exclusivity of internal
monitoring, from where will those external mechanisms
come?

institution of lifetime employment using complimentarity as a tool.
' Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 15, at 12. For example, Sugeno &
Suwa note that with the opening of the external labor market,
"[m]anagement will face the disincentive to invest in education and
training for the cultivation of human resources." SUGENO & SUWA, supra
note 48, at 6. This, in turn, requires the retooling of the educational
system to provide non-employment based vocational training. Id. at 15.

